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INTRODUCTION
Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education' in 1954, the intervention
of the courts into the field of education has been unprecedented. In the
two decades since Brown, the federal courts have been concerned with
implementing the constitutional requirement that no student is to be
denied equal educational opportunity because of his race. But in the late
sixties, courts also became involved in other, non-racial areas of equal
educational opportunity, although the real impact of this litigation was
not to come until the first half of the present decade. Unequal resources,
the failure to provide appropriate education (or any education at all) for
the handicapped, and the tracking and classifying (and misclassifying) of
students all became the subjects of legal attack. The law has evolved, or is
evolving, so rapidly in these areas that there is still a great deal of un-
certainty as to just what the law is.
This article provides a brief overview of the current legal scene as it
pertains to Equal Educational Opportunity. To do that requires some
definition of that phrase. The number and variety of definitions of Equal
Educational Opportunity, however, are legion-and one man's Equal
Educational Opportunity may well be another man's law suit. Neverthe-
less, for the purposes of this article, the definitions will be grouped into
three basic categories: equal treatment of the races, equal access to educa-
tional resources, and equal educational outcomes.2
The first definition-equal treatment of the races-is concerned with
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'347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 For a thorough and enlightening treatment of the various definitions of equal educational
opportunity, see Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEx. L. REv.
411 (1973).
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non-discriminatory treatment for all public school students, regardless of
race; and now one might add, regardless of sex.
The second definition focuses on equal access to school resources-
whether the measure be dollars, facilities, or services. This definition or
theory, as one astute commentator has put it, assumes that if the state pro-
vides equal exposure to school resources, each student will have an equal
probability of academic, and presumably life, success.3 Where the in-
equalities are blatantly obvious, such as when blacks or other minorities
or the poor are uniformly excluded from college preparatory tracks or are
given physics textbooks written before the discovery of the atom, judicial
intervention clearly seems appropriate. When students are completely
excluded from the public schools, particularly when such a sanction is
administered without any procedural safeguards,4 the courts should find
little difficulty in seeing this as a clear denial of equal educational oppor-
tunity. It has further been argued that when children are taught in a
language-English-that they cannot understand, or when students are
unable to pay fees for textbooks or other items essential for an education,
the courts should treat this as the functional equivalent of exclusion.5 But
where the inequalities are less clear or perhaps have some educationally
relevant basis, it becomes difficult for the courts to find judicially manage-
able standards for intervention.
The third definition of equal educational opportunity-equal educa-
tional outcomes-is the most difficult one as it focuses on the effective-
ness of the educational process. Under this definition, the state has an
affirmative obligation to compensate for inequalities among individuals.
"[It is not equal treatment if] the able bodied and the paraplegic are given
the same state command to walk." 1 This doctrine thus permits wide dis-
parities in the allocation of education resources, so long as the different
needs of children are being met in a way that results in equality in the
outcomes or results of the schooling process.
Each of these definitions of equal educational opportunity has much to
recommend it; indeed, on occasion, all three of these doctrines can and
should come to focus at one time. However, the courts have more readily
addressed inequalities of the first and the second type, than of the third.7
3 Id. at 473.
See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
5 See, e.g., Yudof, supra note 2; Roos, The Potential Impact of Rodriguez on Other School
Reform Litigation, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 566 (1974); Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791, 803
(9th Cir. 1973) (Hill, J., dissenting); id. at 805 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting from denial of
hearing en banc).
"Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d at 806.
'See McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 331 (N.D. Ill. 1968), af'd. mem. sub nom.
McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969), where the plaintiffs had asked that public school
expenditures be allocated according to student needs. The court ruled that no discoverable
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The current judicial perspective of equal educational opportunity as it
concerns equal treatment of the races (and the sexes) is presented in Part
I of this article. Part II deals with the law as it relates to that theory of
equal educational opportunity reflected in the demand for equal access
to educational resources. In Part III, litigation concerned with equal
educational opportunity for the handicapped is reviewed, including the
potential impact of the Rodriguez" decision on future litigation of this
type. Finally, Part IV discusses the most recent Supreme Court decision
on the constitutionally-required procedural safeguards in student sus-
pensions and expulsions.
I
EQUAL TREATMENT OF THE RACES (AND SEXES)
Racial Discrimination8a
The issues involved in school desegregation which concern the courts
today are clustered around three substantive areas. The first deals with the
violation of a substantive constitutional right-the circumstances under
which the segregated pattern of schools is a violation of the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment,0 giving rise to a duty to de-
segregate. The second area focuses on the nature and extent of the remedy
that will be required once the duty to desegregate is established. The
third area looks to what have been termed second-generation problems-
problems that arise after the public schools have officially been "de-
segregated" which continue to frustrate the equal educational oppor-
tunities of minority students.
The violation
The Swann case'0 is undoubtedly typical of what will be found in the
South: a past history of district-wide de jure segregation and a failure to
completely disestablish a formerly dual school system. In this situation,
the Court presumes a causal connection between a school district's ad-
mitted past discrimination and the present segregated pattern.
What kinds of evidence are needed to show that in a specific school
district there are "vestiges" of past state-imposed segregation? How are
and manageable standards existed for it to make this determination. Id. at 335. See also Yudof,
supra note 2.
'San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
" For an expanded treatment of the issues in this section, see Levin & Moise, School
Desegregation Litigation in the Seventies and the Use of Social Science Evidence, 39 Law &
Contemp. Prob. No. 1, - 1975.
9 "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws," U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
21 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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causal links to the past to be established? In Swann, the Court points out
that past discriminatory conduct of the school board might have con-
tributed to the creation and maintenance of segregated residential patterns
which, when coupled with the present use of geographic proximity as the
basis for assignment, produce segregated patterns of student attendance."
The remedy
The more significant issue today, at least as far as the public is con-
cerned, is the extent of integration that will be required and the methods
by which that integration must be brought about, once a violation of the
equal protection clause has been found. The Court is fairly categorical
about the objective: the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation,
taking into account the "practicalities" of the situation.12 What are the
remedies that are available to the plaintiff and when do they become "im-
practical?"
Racial balance or mathematical ratios. To what extent is "racial bal-
ance" required? We are told in Swann that
"[t]he constitutional command to desegregate schools does not mean that
every school in every community must always reflect the racial composition
of the school system as a whole.
... [t]he use made of mathematical ratios was no more than a starting point
in the process of shaping a remedy, rather than an inflexible require-
ment ... Awareness of the racial composition of the whole school system is
likely to be a useful starting point in shaping a remedy to correct past
constitutional violations ... ." 13
Busing. The Court has said that busing is to be used where feasible,
but the times and the distances should not be "so great as to either risk the
health of the children or significantly impinge on the educational proc-
ess." 14 But what must a school board show as evidence that busing is
harmful to the health of the children? In a recent Virginia case involving a
desegregation plan which included busing, the district court permitted
children in kindergarten and the first and second grades to remain in their
neighborhood schools on the basis of a pediatrician's testimony that such
young children would be "physically and psychologically affected" by
compulsory busing for long periods of time.15 Another question is whether
n Id. at 7,20-21.
2Id. at 26.
3Id. at 24-25.
14 Id. at 30-31.
IvThompson v. School Bd., 363 F. Supp. 458, 460 (E.D. Va. 1973). The decision was upheld
on appeal. 498 F.2d 195 (1974). Judge Winter, in his dissenting opinion, found reliance on the
pediatrician's testimony inappropriate:
... I record my suspicion of the basis on which the district court approved retention of a
dual system for grades 1 and 2. It relied heavily on the testimony of Dr. Hogge, a
Vol. 4, No. 3
Equal Educational Opportunity 415
the extraordinary costs attributable to busing in a system which is already
seriously financially hard pressed-requiring cutbacks in educational pro-
grams or increases in class size to free up money for the purchase and opera-
tion of buses-can be seen as "imping[ing] on the educational process."
Faculties. The Supreme Court has required that teachers in segregated
schools be reallocated throughout the school system so that the composition
of each school's staff approximates that of the entire system.16 Compared
to the position the Court has taken on the use of mathematical ratios to
balance the racial composition of the students of each school, the Court
has been much less cautious and equivocal when it comes to balancing
faculty.'7
"White Flight." If the remedy will precipitate "white flight" from the
community or from the public school system altogether, making ultimate
achievement of integration impossible, will a lesser remedy be substituted?
The Fourth Circuit has had extensive debate over whether desegregation
orders should be drawn to minimize the "white flight" phenomenon.'8 It
pediatrician, to the effect that the health of students in kindergarten and the first and
second grades would be adversely affected if they were not permitted to attend neighborhood
schools. But as I read the testimony of Dr. Hogge, it was-beside the obvious that there are
limits to the physical endurance to children in grades 1 to 7, and if transportation, coupled
with the usual school day, exceeded those limits, the effect would be deleterious to the
child-that the effect of transportation on the physical and mental health of a child
depends upon whether he is happy which, in turn, depends upon whether he is transported
to a school "of his choice or his parents' choice." If the child is unhappy, i.e., not transported
to a school of his choice or his parents' choice, "then it follows from there, as the night
does the day, that you're just going to have a poor situation." Acceptance of Dr. Hogge's
thesis, it seems to me, would be to require application of the equal protection clause to
depend upon a plebiscite by parents. This is a novel doctrine which I do not think finds
support in the authorities.
498 F. 2d at 198-99.
as See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1971); Davis v. Board
of Sch. Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 36 (1971); United States v. Montgomery Cty Bd. of Educ., 395
U.S. 225, 232-236 (1969).
17 Compare Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1971) with
United States v. Montgomery Cty Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969).
18 Judge Craven, concurring and dissenting in Brunson v. Board of Trustees of Sch. Dist.
No. 1 of Clarendon Cry, 429 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1970), after noting that in 1969, when there
were 2,408 black students and 256 white enrolled, 110 white students "fled the public school
system in favor of a parochial private school," and 100 more applied for admission for the
following fall, said that
judges in fashioning remedies cannot successfully ignore reality.... [S]ome degree of
moderation in selecting a remedy is more likely to accomplish the desired result, a
unitary, non-racial public school system, than is unyielding fidelity to the arithmetic of
race....
The threat of flight from the public school system ordinarily should not be allowed to
influence the selection of the plan or its judicial approval. It is relevent here only because
the whites constitute such a small minority....
[A] practical approach to the problem would ... greatly diminish the temptation to flee
the system....
Id. at 821-22.
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has been suggested, however, that the silence of the majority in Milliken v.
Bradley,'9 taken together with Justice Marshall's dissent in that case, 20
"means that white flight can never be a relevant factor in considering the
appropriate remedy for dismantling a dual school system." 21 The Supreme
Court, in Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia,22 recognized the
phenomenon of "white flight," but not in the context of minimizing the
impact of a desegregation plan by compromising the plan in an effort to
retain whites who might flee if there were total desegregation. Instead the
Court prohibited a city from withdrawing from an existing county school
district which was still under federal court order to disestablish a dual
school system. The possibility of "white flight" from the county school
system to the proposed city system was one of the factors the Court felt
"would actually impede the process of dismantling the existing dual
system." 23
Remedies which disproportionately burden minorities. Some cases
have raised the issue of the disproportionate busing burden borne by
blacks. Courts have accepted "one-way" busing as a component of a de-
segregation plan, meaning that it is only the black children who are
bused to white neighborhoods to attend schools.2 4 While formerly all-
Judge Sobeloff, in a separate concurring opinion, responded:
The dissenters agree that the Board's freedom of choice plan is deficient, but they consider
the remedy too strong. As they point out, we are threatened in this case with an exodus of
white students that tends to convert the court-ordered integration into an exercise in
futility....
It would... astonish the Brown court to learn that 16 years later ... it was seriously
being contended that desegregation might not be required insofar as it threatened to impair
majority white situations....
The dissent's exposition of the white majority thesis is only in connection with its
perception of a serious "white flight" problem....
"White Flight" is one expression of resistance to integration, but the Supreme Court has
held over and over that courts must not permit community hostility to intrude on the
application of constitutional principles.... [D]issidents who threaten to leave the system
may not be enticed to stay by the promise of an unconstitutional though palatable plan....
[T]he road to integration is served neither by covert capitulation nor by overt com-
promise....
The purported restriction of the thesis to extreme white minority-white flight situations
is really no limitation at all. Rather it offers a premium for community resistance. More
to be feared than white flight in Clarendon County would be any judicial countenancing
of the suggestion that abandoning or qualifying a desegregation program is a legally
acceptable way to discourage flight....
Id. at 824, 826-27.
418 U.S. 717 (1974).
Id. at 801-02.
Craven, The Impact of Social Science Evidence on the Judge: A Personal Comment, 39
LAw & CONTEaP. PROB. No. 1, - (1975).
-407 U.S. 451 (1972).
=Id. at 466.
24 Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile Cty, 483 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1971); Norwalk
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black schools can be closed for "non-racial reasons," the courts have held
that they cannot be closed on the basis of "racial considerations." 25 For
example, in a case originating in Jacksonville, Florida, the Fifth Circuit
upheld the closing of five formerly black schools on the ground that there
were sufficient non-racial reasons: all were deteriorated; one was located
between a slaughterhouse, a polluted creek, and a city incinerator; and
in three schools the incidence of vandalism and intrusion were so frequent
and serious that teachers and children were locked in their rooms for
safety.2 6 This particular issue of the disproportionate burden has not yet
been treated by the Supreme Court.
Metropolitan area relief. The Supreme Court, in its decision in Mil-
liken v. Bradley,27 indicated that there may be limits as to remedy, despite
a clear-cut violation of the equal protection clause. In the Detroit case, the
Supreme Court accepted the lower court's finding that the system was
segregated as a result of actions of school officials, making it a de jure
segregation violation. Nevertheless, an acceptable desegregation plan could
not include parts of fifty-three suburban school districts when there was no
evidence that they had contributed to the segregation of the Detroit schoolr
system. The Court, however, left open the possibility-and this is particu-
larly evident when one reads Justice Stewart's concurring opinion-that
certain circumstances could arise when metropolitan consolidation or
inter-district busing would be an appropriate remedy.
The belief that the Supreme Court has not totally closed the door on an
inter-district remedy finds additional support in its treatment of a recent
Sixth Circuit decision ordering cross-district busing for Louisville, Ken-
tucky.28 The initial decision in this case was appealed to the Supreme
Court just as the Detroit case was being decided. Rather than overturning
the Louisville decision right then and there along with its decision in
the Detroit case, the Supreme Court sent it back to the Sixth Circuit, asking
it to reconsider the Louisville case in light of Milliken v. Bradley.29 The
Sixth Circuit did reconsider the case. The court concluded that the prob-
CORE v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 423 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1970); Parris v. School Comm. of
Medford, 305 F. Supp. 356 (D. Mass. 1969).
-5 See, e.g., Ellis v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 465 F.2d 878, 880 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 966 (1973); Mims v. Duval Cty Sch. Bd., 447 F.2d 1330, 1331-32 (5th Cir. 1971); Carr v.
Montgomery Cry Bd. of Educ., 429 F.2d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 1970).
Mins v. Duval Cty Sch. Bd., 447 F.2d 1330, 1332 (5th Cir. 1970).
21418 U.S. 717 (1974).
Haycraft v. Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973) (Louisville Independent School
District). See also Newburg Area Coundil, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973)
(Jefferson County School District), consolidated with Haycraft for appeal by the Sixth Circuit.
In addition, the Court of Appeals rejoined the Anchorage Independent School District in the
action brought by the plaintiff Haycraft. The Jefferson County School District embraces all of
Jefferson County, Kentucky, except that portion within the Louisville Independent School
-District and the Anchorage Independent School District.
- 418 US. 918 (1974).
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lem in Milliken was that the remedy "was broader than the constitutional
violation" but that in the case of Louisville (with a pupil population fifty
percent black) and Jefferson County (with a pupil population only four
percent black), "the situation presented is that of two districts in the
same county of the state being equally guilty in failing to eliminate all
vestiges of segregation... ." 3 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit noted that
on remand of the case, the district court's order could include an inter-
district remedy.
Second-generation problems
It seems likely that not much new legal ground will be broken in the
next few years as to whether or not a violation of the equal protection
clause exists (certainly as far as the South is concerned), and as to what is
acceptable as a remedy-with the possible exception of the question of
how wide the Supreme Court has left open the door to an inter-district
approach after the Detroit case. The real issues for the next few years will
center around the so-called "second-generation" problems. Following are
some of the second-generation problems which have already surfaced:
Student discipline. When a school system has newly desegregated,
often a disproportionate number of black students seem to be suspended,
expelled, or otherwise disciplined. There is evidence that suggests that
such sanctions are being used in a discriminatory manner. The judge in
Hawkins v. Coleman,31 a recent case involving the Dallas, Texas school
system, found that blacks were systematically suspended more frequently,
endured longer suspensions, and were also subjected to corporal punish-
ment much more often than whites-particularly in schools where whites
were a majority.32 The superintendent of the Dallas school district testi-
fied that this was attributable to "institutional racism." 33 Other testimony
indicated that black students would become more frustrated as the in-
stitution continued to refuse to respond to their needs and ambitions and
that this frustration would be reflected in one of two attitudes: either in-
creased passivity or increased hostility, the latter of course, resulting in in-
creased "suspendable" behavior. 34 The court also found that conduct by
blacks that would not be "unusual" or "offensive" in a black environment
becomes, to many teachers, "disruptive" or "suspendable conduct." 35 The
court ordered a total overhaul of procedures by the school system.
2o Newburg Area Council v. Board of Educ. of Jefferson Cty, Ky., 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir.
1974).
376 F. Supp. 1330 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
2Id. at 1333-35.
MId. at 1336.
3' Id.
as Id.
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Tracking and ability grouping. An important case in which the use of
ability grouping and testing was challenged is Hobson v. Hansen.36 In
that case the court abolished the tracking system used in the public schools
of the District of Columbia which placed minority students in the lower
levels of the standard curricula. The court noted that although "the intent
was not to make pigeonholes into which pupils would be permanently
sorted like mail of different classes," 37 the evidence conclusively demon-
strated that once a student was placed in a lower track, there was rarely
any upward movement. The four-track system, according to the court, had
degenerated into a "four-rut system." 38 Students were assigned to a particu-
lar track on the basis of standardized achievement test scores. The court
found that the tests used were biased against Negro and other low-income
students:
When standard aptitude tests are given to low income Negro children, or
disadvantaged children, the tests are less precise and less accurate--so much
so that test scores become practically meaningless. Because of the impov-
erished circumstances that characterize the disadvantaged child, it is
virtually impossible to tell whether the test score reflects lack of ability-or
simply lack of opportunity. Moreover, the probability that test scores of the
Negro child or the disadvantaged child will be depressed because of some-
what unique psychological influences, further compounds the risk of in-
accuracy.39
This seems to be a much stronger attack on tracking per se than any
other decision to date, probably due, in part, to the extreme inflexibility
of the tracking system in the District of Columbia, which extended as far
down as the early elementary grades. Most courts have intervened in this
area only when it is obvious that school officials are using the device of
tracking children in order to prevent integration. Thus, the courts have
held that when a formerly dual, segregated school system has just recently
been, or is in the process of being dismantled, pupil assignment by stan-
dardized test scores is prohibited when the result is the perpetuation of
the dual system. This is true for segregation within the system, 40 within
individual schools 41 or within individual classrooms.42 The problem has
269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nor. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
m 269 F. Supp. at 458-59.
Id. at 464.
I'd. at 485.
"
0See Lemon v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 444 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Sunflower Cty Sch. Bd., 430 F.2d 839, 841 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Tunica Cty Sch.
Dist., 421 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 951 (1970); Singleton v. Jackson Munic.
Separate Sch. Dist., 419 F.2d 1211, 1219 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd and remanded in part on other
grounds, sub nom. Carter v. West Felicia Parish Sch. Bd., 396 U.S. 290 (1970).
1 See Moses v. Washington Parish Sch. Bd., 456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1013 (1972).
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been to develop remedies that cure civil rights violations without inter-
fering with legitimate educational judgments about the need to group
children by ability.
Resegregation. To what extent will school officials be held responsible
for resegregation ("white flight" either from the school district or from
the public school system)? There are several factors that are within the con-
trol of school officials that might encourage or inhibit resegregation: the
overall quality of the educational offering; improvement of older physical
plants; and the preparation of teachers, students, and the community for
the process of desegregation. While some of these factors have been in-
corporated in court-ordered desegregation plans, it is not clear whether
courts will find independently that there is a legal duty upon school
officials to retard resegregation.
Sex Discrimination
The law regarding sex discrimination is much less settled than that
regarding race discrimination. There are, however, a number of federal
statutes concerned with sex discrimination in schools, most of them deal-
ing with discrimination in employment. 43 But the most important piece
of legislation, if one is speaking of equal educational opportunity, is Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 44 which, while it also deals with
sex discrimination in employment in education, is primarily concerned
with the differential treatment of students on the basis of sex in regard to
curriculum, extra-curricular activities, and student discipline regulations.
The comments made in this article concerning Title IX requirements
are based in large part on the revised proposed regulations, although
further changes in these regulations are likely.45
In many situations, however, a claim of constitutional rather than
statutory violation can be made. This section of the article first discusses
the Supreme Court's treatment of gender-based discrimination in general
in order to enable a clearer understanding of lower court decisions which
have dealt specifically with sex discrimination in school-related matters.
0See Acree v. County Bd. of Educ., 458 F.2d 486, 488 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1006 (1972).
4' VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination in employment on the
basis of sex. This Act covers all educational institutions as well as states and municipalities.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)(1970). The Equal Pay Act of 1963, extended to cover professional
employees such as teachers and school administrators, prohibits salary discrimination on the
basis of sex when employees perform substantially similar work. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d)(1) (1970).
- 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (Supp. 1973).
" On June 20, 1974, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare published proposed
regulations for implementing this Title, and invited comment on the regulations. By October
15, they had received 9700 responses. The regulations were then revised and sent to the
President for approval. After the President approved the regulations, they were returned
to Congress, which has forty-five days in which to act. The revised regulations appear in 40
Fed. Reg. 24128 (1975).
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The second part of this section suggests the kinds of situations to which
Title IX might apply.
The Supreme Court and Sex Discrimination
Between 1868, when the fourteenth amendment was ratified, and 1971,
not a single statute which discriminated on the basis of sex was found by
the Supreme Court to be in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Legis-
lation which discriminates on the basis of sex appears to be grounded
either on the need to protect women or on assumed differences between
the sexes in ability. A review of the cases presenting challenges to such sex
distinctions indicates that, historically, Supreme Court justices have had a
deep-seated belief in woman's "separate place." In large part, the Supreme
Court justified its denial of equal opportunities to women by emphasizing
their unique role in bearing children.
In 1873, a state's refusal to admit women lawyers to the bar was held not
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Justice Bradley's concurring
opinion indicates the status which women were to be afforded:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex ... unfits it for
many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organi-
zation... indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to
the domain and functions of womanhood. The paramount destiny and
mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother. This is the law of the Creator.46
This attitude of the judiciary prevailed well into the twentieth century.47
Then, more than a century after the ratification of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the Supreme Court-for the first time-held that a statute establish-
ing a classification based solely on gender violated the equal protection
clause. Before describing this case, titled Reed v. Reeds 48 a brief review of
the tests used to determine whether or not a particular statute violates the
"0Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wail.) 130, 141 (1873). In the Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), the Supreme Court had confined the equal protection clause, "in
light of the [amendment's] history ... and [its] pervading purpose .... " to situations in which
the "newly emancipated negroes" had been discriminated against. Id. at 71. In the Bradwell
case, therefore, the denial of admission to the bar was attacked on the basis that the privileges
and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment had been violated.
fore than two decades later, a similar case was again appealed to the Supreme Court. In
this case, the plaintiff had been admitted to the District of Columbia bar and had sought
admission to the Virginia bar under a statute providing that any "person" who had previously
been admitted to practice in any other state or the District of Columbia could practice law in
Virginia. The state's highest court construed "person" to mean "male," and this was
unanimously upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894).
" See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948);
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
1- 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment may help to under-
stand the positions of members of the Court on gender-based discrimina-
tion.49 The traditional equal protection analysis is utilized in such areas
as economic and business regulations in which there is a strong presump-
tion of constitutional validity. The legislature has wide discretion in
assessing the problems to be dealt with and in deciding what classifica-
tions are reasonable; only if the classification is totally irrational and
arbitrary will the classification be found to be impermissible.
A different equal protection test is applied to certain "suspect" classifi-
cations. In these cases, the classification is subjected to close scrutiny by
the Court. The classifications termed suspect-such as race or national
origin-are required to have more than a rational connection with a
legitimate state purpose. Thus a suspect classification requires that the
state have a compelling governmental interest, meaning that it must show
that there is no other less onerous, less discriminatory means by which it
could achieve its legitimate objective.
The Court has articulated a number of tests or criteria by which to
determine whether a class is "suspect":50
1. Does the class have an immutable characteristic?
2. Has there been a history of invidious discrimination against the class
in question?
3. Is the class a discrete and insular minority?
4. Is the class politically powerless?
5. Does the classification stigmatize members of the class as inferior?
The obvious question, then, is are the similarities between race and sex
classification sufficient to warrant treating both as suspect?
Clearly classification on the basis of sex meets the first test-sex is an
immutable characteristic.
[W]hat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statutes as intelligence or
physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that
the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or
contribute to society. 51
For a very thorough treatment of the two-tiered equal protection analysis, see Develop-
ments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAuv. L. Rav. 1065 (1969).
w The close judicial scrutiny given statutes which classify on the basis of characteristics
deemed suspect has its origin in the suggestion of the Court that a "narrower scope for opera-
don of the presumption of constitutionality" may be dictated when reviewing "statutes directed
at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities."
[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).
51 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
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The second test, a history of invidious discrimination, is also met since
there is a long history of sex discrimination in which the same restrictions
have been imposed on women as were once imposed on blacks under the
pre-Civil War slave codes. Among other restrictions, women were pre-
vented from making a contract, were denied the right to vote, could not
hold office or serve on juries, and if married, could not hold or convey
property.52
Women do not literally meet the third test-rather than being a "dis-
crete and insular minority," they are a statistical majority. But their access
to the political decision-making process has been so limited that one could
say that, in effect, they are both "an insular minority" and-the fourth
test-"politically powerless," thus entitling them to special protection of
the Court.53
But the last test-whether separation of the sexes in certain activities
stigmatizes women as separation of the races stigmatizes blacks-is more
difficult to satisfy. In the case of racial separation in the school system, such
separation in itself connotes stigma. Further, racially separate schools were
also unequal in fact. Thus an absolute prohibition of separate but equal
in the race context seems appropriate. But does the argument apply equally
in the sex context? Consider these examples: Do single sex high schools
necessarily stamp women with a badge of inferiority? Similarly, while it
would be impermissible for a high school to have separate black and white
teams, is there the same stigma if women have their own teams and compete
among themselves rather than with the male students? Or take public
restrooms--does the same stigma attach to women when there are separate
Ladies' and Men's rooms as attached when the signs read White Women/
Colored Women?
In the Reed case, the Court struck down an Idaho statute which gave
mandatory preference to men over women when, as members of the same
entitlement class (parents), they applied for appointment as administrator
of an estate. Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous court,54 found
that this was an arbitrary legislative choice even though "the objective of
reducing the workload on probate courts by eliminating one class of con-
tests was not without some legitimacy." 55 Thus while the Court says it is
applying the minimal rational basis test, under which the Court has almost
invariably upheld the validity of statutes, the Court seems to be using a
somewhat different standard to reach its result. Some commentators have
suggested that this decision signals a major departure from the Court's
2 Id. at 684-85.
13 Id. at 686 n. 17.
rA Neither Justice Powell nor Justice Rehnquist had yet been sworn in so the unanimous
Court consisted of only seven justices.
404 U.S. at 76.
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traditional approach of extreme deference to such legislative line-draw-
ing.56 Whether or not this really was a complete departure remains to be
seen.
To return then to the initial question, do racism and sexism differ signif-
icantly from each other and should such differences, if they exist, have
constitutional consequences? Only four of the nine justices currently on
the Court think that classifications based on sex should be treated in the
same manner as those based on race-that is, requiring an extraordinary
justification on the part of the state. Frontiero v. Richardson57-the next
sex discrimination case after Reed v. Reed to reach the Supreme Court-
concerned a challenge to government regulations which permitted service-
men to claim their wives as dependents and thus obtain additional funds
without having to show that over half the wife's support came from the
husband, while women serving in the armed forces had to demonstrate
that their husbands actually were dependent upon them financially. The
regulations were struck down, but only because the remaining justices
(with the exception of Rehnquist, who dissented) felt that the same result
could be reached based on the Reed standard without having to face the
question of whether a classification based on sex was "suspect," since the
only justification the government had offered for its dissimilar treatment
of similarly situated people was "administrative convenience." 58
These cases, plus several others which came to the Supreme Court in
1973 and 1974,51 indicate that as yet there is no clear majority in favor
of treating sex discrimination in the same manner as race discrimination
is now treated at law. If Reed really represents a midpoint standard be-
tween the suspect classification and the minimal relationship standards,
women should find greater protection from the fourteenth amendment.
But the later opinions of the Court seem to narrow its holding: only if
administrative convenience is the sole purpose of the discrimination will
the statute be found to violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
5 See, e.g., Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972). See also San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 107 (1973) (Marshall, J. dissenting) which states that the
Court, in Reed, did use a "more stringent standard of equal protection review."
- 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
Old. at 691-92.
51 Two somewhat related cases came to the Supreme Court in 1974, both having to do with
classifications based on a sex-specific characteristic rather than actual discrimination on the
basis of sex. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414
U.S. 632 (1974).
Lafleur concerned school board rules which require teachers to take leave without pay at a
fixed point in their pregnancy-generally five months before the expected date of birth. Justice
Stewart, writing for a majority which included Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun, held that "the freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life
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The lower court cases
The only cases before the Supreme Court involving sex discrimination
against students have been cases concerned with admission to institutions
of higher education. Thus the recent decisions of the lower courts are the
only authority to date in this area.
Interscholastic athletic competition. The Eighth Circuit recently
handed down a decision in a case in which an action had been brought to
enjoin enforcement of a rule promulgated by the Minnesota State High
School League barring females from participating with males in high
school interscholastic athletics. 60 The female plaintiffs wanted to partici-
pate in non-contact interscholastic sports: one in tennis, one in cross-
country skiing and cross-country running. The court held for the plaintiffs
because their high schools did not provide teams for females in these
sports. Thus the court did not face the question of whether the schools can
constitutionally provide separate but equal facilities for females in inter-
scholastic athletics. And since the sports were non-contact sports, the court
did not need to determine if females could constitutionally be precluded
from competing with males in such contact sports as football.
Curriculum. In many school districts, women are barred from taking
shop or vocational courses. The reasons for such exclusion have been char-
acterized as follows: "tradition," "the asserted inappropriateness of such
courses for women," and "concern that the allegedly less-coordinated fe-
male student might be more injury-prone than her male counterpart." 61
Several women students have successfully challenged such practices; in
each instance, the case has been settled before judicial decision.
Admission to selective high schools. The admission standards of an
elite academic high school in San Francisco-the only high school in that
is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Since there was a conclusive presumption affecting every pregnant teacher-regardless of her
physical capability to continue teaching-rather than an individualized determination-the
regulation was held to be unconstitutional. There was no discussion of gender-based dis-
crimination per se.
Geduldig v. Aiello, the majority opinion again written by Justice Stewart, was concerned
with a state disability insurance program which excluded normal pregnancies from its
insurance scheme. As the majority saw it, no one was being excluded from a benefit because
of gender; rather, it merely removed one physical condition from the list of compensable
disabilities. The line-drawing by the legislature was between pregnant women and nonpregnant
persons-the first group being exclusively female but the second group including members
of both sexes. This time the dissenters were Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall. They
saw the program "singling out for less favorable treatment a gender-linked disability peculiar
to women." 417 U.S. at 501.
cO Brenden v. Independent Sch. Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973). See also Pennsylvania
v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 43 U.S.L.W. 2400 (Pa. Commonwealth Ct., Mar.
19, 1975); C. Fabri & E. S. Fox, The Female High School Athlete and Interscholastic Sports, 4
J. LAW & Enuc. 285 (1975).
cl D. KIRP 9 M. YUDOF, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 503 (1974).
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city where admission is based upon grade point averages-was recently
challenged. 62 When a group of female applicants was denied admission
despite the fact that they had higher grades than male students who were
admitted, they filed suit. The cut-off point for admitting female students
had traditionally been higher than for males. It was estimated that if the
same cut-off point were used for both sexes, 60% of those admitted would
be female. In reviewing the allegation of sex discrimination, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals referred to the Supreme Court decisions of Reed
and Frontiero for the proposition that sex classifications must be examined
with more care than is usually applied under the traditional "rational
relation" test, without having to determine whether the "strict judicial
scrutiny" applicable to "suspect classifications" such as race, is appro-
priate.63 Even under the less strict Reed standard, the circuit court found
that the difference in admission standards could not be justified. It found
no support for the assertion that an equal ratio of the sexes is required for
good education. Moreover, the court noted that the evidence that females
get better grades in early school years but that males catch up in high school
was inconclusive.6 4
Title IX
The next question is how the regulations under Title IX would
deal with some of these same problems. First, it should be noted that
the sex discrimination provisions of Title IX resemble quite closely
those of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibits dis-
crimination against the beneficiaries of all federal monies on the basis of
race, color, and natural origin but not sex. Title IX, on the other hand,
prohibits sex discrimination in federally funded educational programs.
Both Title VI and Title IX are enforced by HEW's Office for Civil Rights.
The sanctions for noncompliance are the same: school systems which are
out of compliance can have their current funds revoked, or they can be
barred from eligibility for future awards. In addition, the Department of
Justice may bring suit at HEW's request.6 5 However, unlike Tide VI,
Title IX contains exemptions and deferments which reflect significant
1 Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1974).
01 Id. at 1269.
141d. at 1269 n. 8. An additional claim in the Berkelman case was that despite a special
minority admissions program with a lower cut-off point, the percentages of black, Spanish-
surname, and low income students admitted were substantially below the percentages of these
students in the entire system. The Ninth Circuit held, however, that there was no evidence
of racial and ethnic discriminatory intent, and minority students were not stigmatized or sub-
jected to psychological harm by having to attend one of the comprehensive high schools. Id.
at 1268.
'6 Dunkle & Sandier, Sex Discrimination Against Students: Implications of Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 18 INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION 5,9 (1974).
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popular as well as judicial indecision about the equation of sex and race
discrimination.
Curriculum. No school may provide any course from which students of
either sex are barred, nor require a course for one sex and not the other,
including health and physical education courses, home economics, or
business and technical courses. The regulations would not be satisfied,
for example, by providing a boys' shop class and a girls' shop class, nor is
the school allowed to justify exclusion from any program on the basis of
lack of employment opportunities in that field for members of one sex.
Sex-stereotyping in educational materials, beginning with the first-grade
primer "Dick and Jane"-which portrays females as timid, unimaginative,
and unproductive-and on through high school texts in history, which
often do not mention female contributions at all, has been recognized as a
serious problem by HEW. However, HEW has declined to deal with this
problem for fear that censorship of school materials might raise serious
first amendment questions. The regulations do cover testing and counsel-
ling materials, which may not differ for the two sexes.66
Extracurricular activities (particularly athletics). The proposed regu-
lations initially provided that no one be barred from athletic participation
on the basis of sex, though separate but equal (in terms of facilities and
equipment) teams for each sex were permitted when selection was on the
basis of competitive skill. The revised regulations, however, are consider-
ably weaker. 67 Women may not try out for men's teams in the case of con-
tact sports (defined as boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, and
basketball), even if the men's teams are the only teams. And the school is
not required to start a woman's team in any of the contact sports.68 Women
may try out for men's teams in non-contact sports, such as swimming, if
there is no women's team. 69 Schools do not have to make "affirmative ef-
forts" to increase the interest and participation of women students in sports
where they have had little opportunity in the past, nor need there be equal
spending for men's and women's teams or programs .7
The sharpest battle had been over the requirement that gym classes
must be offered on a non-discriminatory basis-in effect, cutting out sex-
segregated gym programs. Under the revised regulations, physical edu-
"A recent cartoon suggests the kind of conduct that may now be prohibited. This cartoon
shows a man sitting behind a very large desk with the title "career counselor" on it; seated
across from his desk is a girl to whom the counsellor is saying "There are enormous oppor-
tunities for a young girl today-first of all, how fast can you type?" Martinez, Sexism in Public
Education: Litigation Issues, 18 INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION 5, 9 (1974).
"Compare 39 Fed. Reg. § 86.38 at 22236 (1974) with 40 Fed. Reg. § 86.41 at 24142 (1975).
caId.
c-Id.
,Old. § 86A1 (c) at 24143.
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cation classes may be segregated for contact sports and for sex education,
when it is taught as part of the physical education class.71
Student discipline. Many schools have traditionally applied different
behavior and dress codes to male and female students. This is now for-
bidden under the Title IX regulationsla Presumably, therefore, if women
are allowed to wear long hair, male students would also be allowed to wear
their hair to the same length. School officials are forbidden from punishing
any student because he or she is married or is a parent. The pregnant girl
cannot be excluded from her school or from any school activity (unless
she wishes it or her doctor certifies that it is necessary).lb After the birth of
her child, she must be immediately reinstated to her original status.
Employment. Finally, it is worth noting that in the case of any outside
agency that discriminates, schools are required to prevent such an agency
from offering school-sponsored services to students. A school's distributive
education program or work-study program may not place its students with
an employer who will hire only one sex and exclude the other.71c
II
EQUAL ACCESS TO RESOURCES72
In discussing fiscal inequity, it should be noted that there are at least
three levels of inequality in the distribution of education resources:
Inter-State Inequality. The difference in per pupil expenditures among
the states has long been a subject of discussion. By and large, the southern
states spend less per pupil than states in other parts of the country. Alabama
has the lowest statewide average per pupil expenditure level and New
York the highest, if Alaska is excluded, the gap between the two being $858
per pupil.73 The issue of "leveling up" the lower-spending states is one that
the federal government has attempted to address through the Title I
formula.
However, these dollar expenditure comparisons probably overstate the
differences in resources for education. The gap in educational spending
per pupil between the predominantly urban, industrial states of the North
and the more rural states of the deep South, is explained partly by cost
differences for equivalent educational services.74
1Id. §§ 86.34 (c)(e) at 24141.
-11' Id. § 86.31 (c) (4)-(5) at 24141.
"7b Id. § 86.40 at 24142.
' c Id. § 86.31 (c) at 24141.
-For a more extensive treatment of many of the issues dealt with in Section II of this
article, see Levin, School Finance Reform in a Post-Rodriguez World, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
1974 NOLPE CONVENTION (1975) (forthcoming).
7NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, RESEARCH DIVISION, ESTIMATES OF SCHOOL STATISTICS,
1971-72 (1971).
74 See B. LEVIN, T. MULLER, W. SCANLON & M. COHEN, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE: PRESENT
DISPARITIES AND FISCAL ALTERNATIVES 101-07 (1972).
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Intra-State Inequality. The gap between the highest and lowest spend-
ing districts within the State of New York was over $1,200 per pupil in
1969-70.75 Differences between high and low spending districts within a
state not uncommonly are as much as three or four to one, and in some
states, they are as much as twenty to one.
Intra-District Inequalities. The issue of the inequalities in the distribu-
tion of resources among schools within a single district, especially large
urban school districts, is particularly important today in view of Title I
comparability requirements-that state and local resources be distributed
equally on a school-by-school basis, so that these federal funds for the dis-
advantaged supplement rather than supplant state and local funds.
This section focuses on the legal treatment of intrastate disparities in
educational resources. School finance systems which rely in part upon the
local property tax (which means every state with the exception of Hawaii),
because of the variation in the distribution of property wealth, result in
substantial disparities in expenditures per pupil. A comparison of two
school districts within the same county was used by the California court in
Serrano v. Priest78 to illustrate the inequalities: the Beverly Hills school
district, with a per pupil property value of $50,885, raised $1,107 per pupil
with a tax rate of only $2.38 per $100 assessed valuation. Baldwin Park,
with a high proportion of disadvantaged students and serious educational
problems has a per pupil property value of $3,706, which, with a tax rate
of $5.48 per $100 assessed valuation, raised only $2.70 per pupil. The
state offsets some of the disparities: Beverly Hills gets an additional $125
per pupil and Baldwin Park receives $307 per pupil. But the gap between
these two Los Angeles County school districts is still $655 per pupil.7 7
The Serrano court, surveying this situation, commented that
affluent districts can have their cake and eat it too: they can provide a
high quality education for their children while paying lower taxes. Poor
districts, by contrast, have no cake at all.78
Legal Challenges to School Financing
While there has been pressure for reform of school finance since the
beginning of the century, it was only in the late 1960's that the courts were
turned to as the vehicle for reform. And not until August 1971 was legal
victory attained in the form of a negative standard: that the quality of a
7 SENATE SELECT COMM. ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, 92n CONG., 2D Sss., THE
FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY Table Il, at 9 (Comm. Print
1972).
78Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P. 2d 1241,96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
77These figures are derived from data presented in the Serrano opinion. 5 Cal. 3d at 594,
598, 600 n. 15,487 P. 2d at 1248, 1250, 1252 n. 15, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 608, 610, 612 n. 15.
785 Cal. 3d at 600,487 P. 2d at 125-52, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 611-12.
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pupil's public education may not be a "function of the wealth of... [a
pupil's] parents and neighbors." 79This came to be called the principle of
"fiscal neutrality." 80 Reform-minded lawyers eagerly seized upon this
standard and headed for the nearest courthouse. Between the Serrano
and the Rodriguez decisions, some fifty-two actions were filed in thirty-one
states.
The California Supreme Court, in Serrano v. Priest, held that Cali-
fornia's system of financing public schools violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The use of the local property tax,
even with state subventions, resulted in substantial disparities among
school districts in per-pupil revenues so that the system discriminated on
the basis of property wealth, which the court treated as a "suspect classifica-
tion." 81 The court also concluded that education was a "fundamental
right" which could not be conditioned on wealth. This permitted the court
to use the compelling state interest standard of equal protection, meaning
that the state bears the heavy burden of showing a compelling interest in
the discriminatory system of school finance; the state failed to meet this
burden. With little variation, courts in other states, including a three-
judge district court in Texas, paralleled this analysis.
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez8 2
The Texas case became the vehicle for a Supreme Court examination
of the way in which we finance our public schools. On March 21, 1973, a
five-to-four decision was handed down, concluding that while "the need is
apparent for reform," 83 the Texas school finance system did not discrimi-
nate against any definable class of poor persons8 4 Moreover, education was
not entitled to claim the status of a fundamental right since it is neither
explicitly nor implicitly guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.85 Thus
the Court applied the rational basis or traditional equal protection test.86
Finding that the Texas system rationally furthered a legitimate state
purpose-that of local autonomy-the Court held it not to be unconstitu-
tional. With Rodriguez, therefore, the first phase of the school finance
reform movement came to an abrupt halt.
The Shift to State Constitutional Provisions
Education Clauses. Less than a month after the Rodriguez opinion
was handed down, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that New Jersey's
'5 Cal. 3d at 589, 487 P. 2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
60See J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970).
81 See discussion supra at 15.
-411 U.S. 1 (1973).
"411 U.S. at 58.
"Id. at 55.
"Id. at 35.
"See discussion supra at 15.
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school finance statutes violated that state's constitution, which commands
the legislature to provide a "thorough and efficient system of free public
schools." 87 Robinson v. Cahill8s thus was the first decision to indicate that
alternative litigation strategies might be successfully pursued, if only the
state courts, rather than the federal, were the arena.
The New Jersey court construed the state constitution's mandate as
requiring equal educational opportunity. The court actually went even
further-a "thorough and efficient" system is one that provides "that
educational opportunity which is needed in the contemporary setting to
equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor
market." I9 What the New Jersey court meant by this standard of "equal
educational opportunity," however, is far from dear. Nor is it clear how
one would measure it or what kind of finance system would embody it. It
sounds somewhat like the "equal educational outcomes" definition of
equal educational opportunity. 0
The court gave the legislature until the end of 1974 to enact legislation
which would define "the content of the educational opportunity the Con-
stitution requires," 91 and which would ensure that this educational oppor-
tunity would be provided equally to all students, regardless of where they
live in the state. When the legislature failed to meet the deadline, the court
extended it and the state legislature is now wrestling with the problem.
Equal Protection Clauses. On remand of the Serrano case to the trial
court, the judge took a different approach from the New Jersey court. The
New Jersey State Supreme Court had declined to ground its decision on the
state equal protection clause,92 basing the decision solely on the educa-
tion clause of the constitution. The Serrano judge, however, held that the
substantial disparity in the ability to raise local revenues for education was
a violation of California's equal protection clause.
The Rodriguez case itself may actually be helpful to Serrano-type
plaintiffs.93 The constitution of almost every state in the Union contains
an explicit educational provision. The Supreme Court's holding in
Rodriguez that education is not a fundamental right because it is not
explicitly or even implicitly mentioned in the federal constitution need
not necessarily impede a state court's finding with regard to the funda-
mentality of education based on the state's constitution. Indeed, this is just
what the Serrano trial court did on remand from the California Supreme
Court. The judge found that education was a fundamental right under the
6 7N.J. CONST. art. VIH, § 4, para. 1.
u 62 N.J. 473, 303 A. 2d 273 (1973).
62 N.J. at 515, 303 A. 2d at 295.
10 See discussion supra at 3.
0162 NJ. at 516, 303 A. 2d at 295.
62 N.J. at 492-93, 502, 303 A. 2d at 283, 288.
Karst, Serrano v. Priest's Inputs and Outputs, 38 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 333 (1974).
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state constitution; thus, conditioning this right on the wealth of a district,
absent a compelling state interest, was unconstitutional.
To sum up the school finance litigation efforts, it appears that while
Rodriguez may have seriously hampered attempts by federal courts to
restructure school finance systems, a variety of state constitutional provi-
sions may become the springboards to judicial reform. Decisions are now
pending in California, Idaho, Massachusetts, and New York. In Connecti-
cut, the lower court has recently held that state's system of financing schools
to be a violation of the state constitution. 4
The Cost-Quality Issue
An important issue in both the California and New Jersey cases was the
relationship of the level of per-pupil expenditures to the quality of educa-
tion. In the Robinson trial, when the cost-quality issue was raised, the
plaintiffs introduced the testimony of several nationally known school
finance experts, educators, and educational testing experts. The trial court
found that there was a "correlation between educational expenditures and
pupil achievement over and above the influence of family and other
environmental factors." 95 The court also found that a large number of
pupils were not getting "an adequate education" due to low per-pupil
revenues in many poor districts despite high tax rates.96 The New Jersey
Supreme Court, with very little discussion, agreed with the trial court as to
the relationship of disparities in expenditures to educational quality. 7
A much more extensive exploration of the cost-quality issue was under-
taken in the Serrano trial.98 The plaintiffs attempted to argue that pupil
"Horton v. Meskill, No. 18-52-83 (Super. Ct. Conn. Dec. 26, 1974).
There have also been some disappointing failures. A year and a half after Northshore
School District v. Kinnear, 84 Wn. 2d 685, 530 P. 2d 178 (1974) was argued before the
Washington Supreme Court, a decision which the dissent characterized as "a legal
pygmy of doubtful origin" that "cannot withstand a critical analysis either factually or
legally" was handed down. 84 Wn. 2d at 732, 530 P. 2d at 204. A majority of the court held
that a review of the record indicated that plaintiffs had not introduced sufficient evidence
to prove their case. A plurality opinion by three of the six justices in the majority stated that
the plaintiffs did not show that "children who live in school districts with low assessed
valuation of property per pupil" were unconstitutionally disadvantaged compared to children
in affluent districts or that "differences in assessed value among the districts denies equal
protection to the taxpayer."
84 Wn. 2d at -, 530 P. 2d at 191. See generally Morris & Andrews, Ample Provision for
Washington's Common Schools: Northshore's Promises to Keep, 10 GONZAGA L. RaV. 19 (1974).
Another disappointing decision was that handed down in Olsen v. Oregon, Case No. 72-
0569 (Lane County Circuit Court, Ore., Feb. 25, 1975).
'5118 N.J. Super. at 253-54.
9Id. at 257.
2- 62 N.J. at 481-83, 303 A. 2d at 276-77.
Is For a complete analysis of the plaintiffs' arguments on this issue, see McDermott & Klein,
The Cost-Quality Debate in School Finance Litigation: Do Dollars Make a Difference? 38 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 415 (1974).
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achievement scores on standardized tests were an inappropriate measure of
education output. The court, after reviewing the voluminous social science
testimony, agreed that educational research on the question had
not reached that degree of reliability that it can be said with any degree
of certainty as to the precise part which the various factors of home, school
or genetics play separately upon pupil achievement in the standardized
reading, mathematics, language, or other achievement-measurement tests.9
However, that was not sufficient to deter the trial judge from concluding
that
a school district's per-pupil expenditure level does play a significant role
in determining whether pupils are receiving a low-quality or a high-quality
education program as measured by pupil test-score results on the stan-
dardized achievement tests.100
The plaintiffs in the Serrano trial were helped by the testimony of school
officials from wealthy districts that their high per-pupil expenditures were
essential to provide high-quality education. 1°1
Despite the ambiguous nature of much of the research in the cost-
quality area, it can be seen from these quotes from the Robinson and
Serrano trial court opinions that neither of the trial judges had much
difficulty in determining that there was a relationship between dollars
spent per pupil and the quality of educational opportunity.
By contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court found that it was impossible to
make such a determination. Justice Powell drew attention to the division
of opinion among "scholars and educational experts" on "the extent to
which there is a demonstrable correlation between educational expendi-
tures and the quality of education," referring to the works of Professors
Jencks, Coleman and others. 102 In Justice Powell's view, since such ques-
tions were "not likely to be divined for all time even by the scholars who
now earnestly debate the issues," the judiciary should
refrain from imposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that
could circumscribe or handicap the continued research and experimenta-
tion so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational problems and
to keeping abreast of everchanging conditions. 103
The Legislative Arena
Obviously, litigation is not the goal but a means to attain the goal,
which is legislative revision of the present methods of financing schools. In
"Serrano v. Priest, Civil No. 938, 254 at 89. (Cal. Super. Ct., Apr. 10, 1974).
a® Id. at 89.
10 Id. at 89-90.
21 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1973).
10 Id. at 43.
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a number of states, new legislation was adopted under the stimulus of the
Serrano decision, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez. But
even in the wake of Rodriguez, a number of states continued to examine
alternative, more equitable ways of financing education.
Among the reforms enacted during the 1972-73 legislative year, were
the following:104
Increased state share of the total education dollar, thus shifting away
from reliance on the local property tax, resulting in a reduction in dis-
parities in per-pupil expenditures among school districts.
Ceilings on tax rates and revenue levels, which also tend to reduce dis-
parities among districts.
Property tax reform and relief measures have been adopted in a few
states. Maladministration of this tax substantially contributes to its regres-
sivity and to the disparities in per-pupil revenues among districts. Some
states have also adopted a "circuitbreaker" provision to provide tax relief
for low-income homeowners and renters.
Cost and need differentials have been incorporated into Florida's newly
enacted school finance formula. A major problem with school aid distribu-
tion formulas in the past has been their failure to take into account cost
differentials among districts in providing similar educational programs.
Central city school districts, because of higher prices or wage rates, often
have to spend more per pupil than rural or suburban school districts in
order to provide a comparable educational program. For example, cities
have to pay more than rural areas for teachers of equivalent experience
and education levels. Cities are also burdened (in the financial sense) by
having a higher proportion of teachers with advanced degrees and years of
experience-putting them at the upper end of the salary schedule. Finally,
site acquisition costs and the unit costs (cost per square foot) of construct-
ing a school facility are substantially higher in central cities than in either
suburban or rural areas.
One problem with the "fiscal neutrality" principle is that it also fails to
recognize the fiscal problems of central cities. The fiscal neutrality or
wealth-free standard was devised in response to a system in which high
property values correlated significantly with high per-pupil expenditures.
Cities, however, have relatively high property values and often higher
than average per-pupil expenditure levels. The fiscal problems of central
city schools, in most cases, stem not from low property values, but from
higher costs for education for the reasons given above and from having a
larger proportion of students from poor and disadvantaged families, who
may require additional resources to "compensate" for the disadvantaged
:
1
14A more detailed analysis of the various features of 1972-73 school finance legislation can
be found in Grubb, The First Round of Legislative Reforms in the Post-Serrano World, 58
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 459 (1974).
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background they bring to school.105 The Florida law provides for a cost-of-
living adjustment and adjustments for certain pupils who require addi-
tional resources.
This brief review of school finance reform suggests that despite the
seeming setback of the Rodriguez decision, the advocates of reform can
still claim a significant victory. If nothing else, they succeeded in exposing
the inequalities that exist in most school finance systems, and, to quote
Justice Stewart, encouraged the movement toward less "chaotic and un-
just" systems.10 6
III
EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY FOR THE
HANDICAPPED
While the immediate consequence of the decision in Rodriguez was to
foreclose a federal attack on certain inequitable school financing programs,
the fact that the majority in that case held that education was not a funda-
mental interest, since it was neither explicitly nor implicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution, threatened the success of other educational reform
litigation then under way. However, the Supreme Court's opinion in
Rodriguez distinguishes inter-district financing inequities-which lead
to relative differences in the quality of education-from a state "financing
system [that] occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunity to
any of its children." 107 Does this then mean that it is unconstitutional to
exclude a class of children such as the mentally retarded from the public
schools? Secondly, if there is a constitutional principle of non-exclusion,
can the principle be extended to cover those children enrolled in public
schools who are "functionally excluded"-that is, effectively denied mean-
ingful access to school services? One such category of children is those
whose native language is not English, but who are nonetheless compelled
to attend schools where only English is spoken.
Handicapped
There are large numbers of handicapped children who continue to be
totally excluded from school. The first legal breakthrough in this area was
in Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsyl-
vania.108 In that state, a retarded child could be barred from receiving an
education if he were deemed "uneducable." Overwhelming evidence was
0- See generally B. LEVIN, T. MULLER, & C. SANDOVAL, THE HIGH COST OF EDUCATION IN
CrrEs (1973).
1 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973).
147 Id. at 37.
1, 3-34 F. SuDo. 1257 (EJ. Pa. 1971); 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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produced by the plaintiffs to show that all children are educable to some
extent. Two legal theories were advanced by the plaintiffs: (1) Procedural
due process is violated when no hearing is provided prior to exclusion;
both the importance of the interests denied (all education) and the
stigma which attaches to the excluded child dictate the need for a prior
hearing. (2) Given the vagueness of the "uneducable" concept, the statutory
exclusion of handicapped students also violates the equal protection clause.
Although the case was settled by consent order, and affirmed by the
court, the court noted that: "having undertaken to provide a free public
education to all its children, including its exceptional children, the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania may not deny any mentally retarded child
access to a free public program of education and training." 109 Under the
consent order, the state of Pennsylvania is to provide a
free, public program of education and training appropriate to the child's
capacity, within the context of the presumption that, among the alternative
programs of education and training required by the statute to be available,
placement in a regular public school class is preferable to placement in a
special public school class and placement in a special public school class
is preferable to placement in any other type of program of education and
training. 10
In another leading case dealing with the retarded and the emotionally
disturbed-Mills v. Board of Education"'--the court held that denying
plaintiffs and their class not just an equal education but all education,
is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. Mills also requires
that there be a hearing prior to the placement of any particular child in
a class for handicapped children, and that education "appropriate to the
needs" of the handicapped children must be provided."12 Mere placement
in an inadequate program would not meet the mandate of the decision.
The case of Lebanks v. Spears,18 filed in the eastern district court of
Louisiana on April 24, 1978, has also been settled by a consent decree in
which the parties agreed that all retarded children should receive an
appropriate education and that procedural safeguards would be established
to insure the propriety of any placement out of a regular classroom. Like
the PARC and Mills decisions, the Lebanks agreement assumes that a
child should be placed in a regular classroom if possible and that, if not,
the child should be assigned to a setting which resembles a normal class-
room as much as possible." 4
101Id. at 1259.
"0Id. at 1260.
- 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
"Id. at 878.
60 F.R.D. 135 (E.D. La. 1973).
1 Thus these three cases have entered the debate now going on in the world of special
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Although the Mills and PARC cases were decided before Rodriguez,
it would seem that nothing in that decision would affect this category of
cases.
Misclassification
Related to litigation on behalf of the retarded is that which deals with
the misclassification of children. The major decision in this area is Larry
P. v. Riles,"5 a case brought in a federal district court in California, in
which the plaintiffs challenged the placement of a disproportionate num-
ber of black children in classes for the educable mentally retarded (EMR)
on the basis of "culturally biased" tests. The court held that, given the
fact that IQ tests were the primary basis for placement in EMR classes and
given the fact that there was a disproportionate number of blacks in these
classes, the burden shifted to the school district to show that "IQ tests are
rationally related to the purpose of segregating students according to their
ability to learn in regular classes, at least insofar as those tests are applied
to black students." 116 The school district could not meet this burden.
A number of other cases which have challenged placement in EMR
classes on the basis of culturally and/or linguistically biased testing pro-
cedures have been settled, after the suits were filed, by consent. Stipulations
in some of these cases acknowledge that large groups of Spanish-speaking
children have been inappropriately placed in EMR classes on the basis of
such tests. Litigation of this type, which really focuses on procedural due
process in the placement of children into special classes for the handi-
capped, appears not to be threatened by the decision in Rodriguez.
Linguistically Handicapped
Can it be argued that the "linguistically-handicapped" cases should
be treated similarly to those cases involving total exclusion? If the educa-
tional process is the communication of ideas, then the child who speaks no
English is absolutely deprived of an education by being compelled to be
educated in a classroom in which he cannot communicate. The result,
therefore, is functional exclusion from the classroom. 117 And since it is an
education: whether it is better for children with special problems to be placed together in a
special class, with a teacher specifically trained to deal with their handicaps, or whether
isolating children from regular school experiences and from normal children will serve to
reinforce their disabilities, lower their self-esteem and, coupled with the low expectations of
teachers, will make them become self-fulfilling prophecies. These courts have come down
clearly on the side of "mainstreaming" the handicapped.
"1343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
26.7d. at 1314.
2' See Roos, The Potential Impact of Rodriguez on Other School Reform Litigation, 38
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 566,573 (1974).
There is yet another category of cases which can be thought of as the "functional exclusion"
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ethnic minority that is being discriminated against by the failure to provide
special assistance, the refusal can be measured against the compelling state
interest test-the stricter test of constitutional scrutiny.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Lau v. Nichols,"18 a case arising
in San Francisco, held that in the absence of state action contributing to
English language deficiencies suffered by 2,850 Chinese-American students,
the claims that these students have been denied equal educational oppor-
tunity could not be upheld. The majority said there could be no denial of
equal educational opportunity since the non-English speaking students
of a child from the classroom, not because of his race or ethnicity but because of his
indigency. The charging of fees for items deemed essential to schooling has been successfully
attacked as a violation of various state constitutional and statutory provisions. See, e.g., Granger
v. Cascade County School District, 499 P. 2d 780 (Mont. 1972) (fees for workbooks and materials
and for athletic equipment used in mandatory physical education course); Bond v. Public
Schools of Ann Arbor, 383 Mich. 693, 178 N.W. 2d 484 (1970) (fees for textbooks and supplies
for specialized courses such as art and home economics); Paulson v. Minidoka County School
District, 93 Idaho 469, 263 P. 2d 935 (1970) (transcript withheld for non-payment of fees for
textbooks).
In Johnson v. New York State Education Dep't, 449 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1971), vacated and
remanded to determine if moot, 409 U.S. 75 (1972), indigent children were unable to pay the
fees required for textbooks. Justice Marshall's concurring opinion poignantly states the
indigent child's dilemma:
[T]extbooks were available upon the payment of a fee, which petitioners were unable
to afford. The practical consequende of this situation was that indigent children were forced
to sit "'bookless, side by side in the same classroom with other more wealthy children learn-
ing with purchase[d] textbooks [thus engendering] a widespread feeling of inferiority and
unfitness in poor children [which] is psychologically, emotionally and educationally dis-
astrous to their well being.'" Indeed, an affidavit submitted to the District Court indicated
that in at least one case, an indigent child was told that "he will receive an 'F' for [each]
day because he is without the required text-books. When the other pupils in the class read
from text-books, the teacher doesn't let him share a book with another pupil, instead she
gives him paper and tells him to draw."
This case obviously raises questions of large constitutional and practical importance. For
two full school years children in elementary grades were denied access to textbooks solely
because of the indigency of their families while these questions were being considered by
the lower courts. ...
Id. at 76-77.
Indigent students in Alabama recently challenged the collection of school fees as a condition
to enrollment in specific courses or extra-curricular activities, the issuance of texts or supplies,
or the receipt of grades. The plaintiffs contended that the Alabama state law permitting the
collection of certain fees discriminated against them on the basis of wealth in violation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The parties settled the suit, agreeing
that there would be a fee exemption procedure which would include the following: (1) the
use of OEO poverty income guidelines to determine ability to pay; (2) a screening committee
which would include representatives of AFDC recipients; and (3) provision of the same materials
and supplies to school children from exempted families as are provided to children for whom
fees have been paid.
The use of fees is still quite widespread, however. See CIuLDREN's DEFENSE FUND, CHILDREN
OUT OF SCHOOL IN AMERICA 78-84 (1974) [hereinafter cited as CHILDREN'S DFrNSE FUND]. Among
other barriers to school attendance attributable to poverty are lack of clothing and lack of
free transportation. Id. at 85-89.
ns 483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
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receive "the same education made available on the same terms and con-
ditions to the other tens of thousands of students in the San Francisco
Unified School District." 119 The court stated that
[e]very student brings to the starting line of his educational career different
advantages and disadvantages caused in part by social, economic and cul-
tural background, created and continued completely apart from any con-
tribution by the school system. That some of these may be impediments
which can be overcome does not amount to a "denial" by the Board of
educational opportunities within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment should the Board fail to give them special attention, this even though
they are characteristic of a particular ethnic group.120
The court went further and said that the difficulty the children had was
"the result of deficiencies created by the appellants themselves in failing
to learn the English language."
The dissent responded:
The plaintiffs in this case are small, Chinese-speaking children.... To
ascribe some fault to a grade school child because of his "failing to learn
the English language" seems both callous and inaccurate. If anyone can
be blamed for the language deficiencies of these children, it is their parents
and not the children themselves. Even if the parents can be faulted (and
in many cases they cannot, since they themselves are newly arrived in a
strange land and in their struggle for survival may have had neither the
time nor opportunity to study any English), it is one of the keystones of
our culture and our law that the sins of the fathers are not to be visited
upon the children. 12'
On appeal from the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court avoided the
constitutional issue by holding that §601 of the Civil Rights Act compelled
a school district receiving federal funds to establish some form of supple-
mental assistance for children who have English language deficiences . -2 2
"OId. at 793.
t m Id. at 797.
221id. at 805. Another member of the court, when a request to hear the case en banc was
denied, stated as follows:
[a]ccess to education offered by the public schools is completely foreclosed to these children
who cannot comprehend any of it. They are functionally deaf and mute .... Discriminatory
treatment is not constitutionally impermissible [the majority says], because all children are
offered the same educational fare, i.e., equal treatment of unequals satisfies the demand of
equal protection. The Equal Protection Clause is not so feeble. Invidious discrimination
is not washed away because the able-bodied and the paraplegic are given the same state
command to walk. Id. at 805-806.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970). The Court cited the HEW guidelines, promulgated under the
Civil Rights Act, which provide that
Where inability to speak and understand the English language excludes national origin-
minority children from effective participation in the educational program offered by a school
district, the district must take affirmative steps to rectify the language deficiency in order
to open its instructional program to these students.
85 C.F.R. 11595 (1970).
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The Court reserved judgment on the equal protection arguments, how-
ever, leaving intact the legal conclusion of the court of appeals that there
was no constitutional right to bilingual education.
Developments in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, repre-
sent a different judicial trend. In Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools,123
a New Mexico case, the court held that providing identical education to
groups which are not identical is a denial of equal protection. Thus the
court rejected the concept that a school merely takes students as it finds
them and held that the school authorities' failure to establish a meaningful
bilingual educational program constituted a denial of equal education to
Chicano students.124 The finding of inequality was based on the results of
I.Q. tests administered to all first and fifth grade students, and the testi-
mony of an educational psychologist that language difficulties accounted
for 80% to 85 % of the achievement difference between Anglo and Chicano
children. 2
5
It is apparent from the Lau and Serna decisions, that the issue of
whether bilingual or compensatory education is constitutionally required
is far from settled.
IV
STUDENT SUSPENSIONS: A DENIAL OF EQUAL
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY?
Before the Supreme Court decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community School District,26 in 1969, nearly all challenges to the dis-
ciplinary authority of school officials were litigated in state courts. The
cases relied upon statutory or common law and almost always the ruling
was in favor of school officials. The burden of proof was clearly on the
plaintiff student to show that a particular regulation was arbitrary and
capricious. Between 1969 and 1975, however, the intervention of the
federal courts in the area of discipline has been unprecedented, culminat-
ing in the recent Supreme Court decision of Goss v. Lopez,127 which held
-' 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D. N.M. 1972), aff'd on other grounds (Title VI rather than fourteenth
amendment), 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).
'A In United States v. Texas, 342 F.Supp. 24 (E.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 518 (5th Cir.
1972), the court ordered a comprehensive bilingual and bicultural educational program to be
instituted. The court relied primarily on the testimony of an expert witness who had asserted
that "cultural incompatibility and English language deficiencies contributed to the Mexican-
American child's general inability to benefit from an educational program designed primarily
to meet the needs of Anglo-Americans." 342 F.Supp. at 26.
351 F.Supp. at 1281-82.
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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that certain procedural safeguards are constitutionally required, even with
a suspension for one to ten days.
School authorities have a relatively small number of sanctions which
they can use in attempting to control a broad spectrum of activities. The
principal sanctions are punishment (e.g., being sent to a detention hall or
corporal punishment); restrictions on extra-curricular activities; and sus-
pension and expulsion. The focus in this article will be on suspensions-
which deny the child the opportunity to receive an education.
The Impact of Suspension on a Student
It should be noted that suspending or expelling a student does nothing
by way of educating him. It is significant, perhaps, that other disciplinary
measures are designed to increase the student's desire for education. Sus-
pensions and expulsions, however, serve to prevent him from receiving an
education in the following ways:1 28
(1) The child is unable to participate in academic work for the period
of the suspension. If the student is already doing poor work, the missed
classes, assignments and exams may mean he will fail completely. In some
schools, for each day of suspension, his grade is zero, so that if he is given
frequent short-term suspensions, he may fail an entire academic year.
Suspensions end up pushing children out of school permanently-if they
are out for a couple of months, they can't really make up the work, and the
"incentive to return to school under the heavy educational handicap which
such a long suspension obviously inflicts, must be very small indeed." 129
(2) Suspensions merely remove difficult children. Suspension is too
often used to dump behavior problems on the communities rather than to
discipline students in order that they may benefit from the educational
system. Even though for the sake of the education of other children in
the class, the removal of a disruptive child from the class, or even from the
school, is justified, school authorities should still be under an obligation
to educate the child who has been removed. Moreover, the child should be
receiving diagnostic or supportive services which might deal with the causes
of the child's misbehavior. 130
(3) Suspension stigmatizes a child while in school and in later life. The
fact of suspension will remain in the child's permanent record and could
affect his future educational and employment prospects.
- 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
- See generally, CmLnaaN's DFFENSE FUND.
Madera v. Board of Education, 267 F.Supp. 356, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND at 135.
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(4) Suspensions are highly correlated with juvenile delinquency by
leaving children idle and on the streets with no supervision. Yet it is these
very children, whose behavior led to suspension, who may need super-
vision the most.131
How Pervasive Is the Use of Suspension?
A review of some statistics relating to suspension and expulsion may
provide some perspective on Goss v. Lopez. Until a few years ago, sus-
pension and expulsion were legitimate, discretionary administrative proc-
esses-often undertaken by the principal of a school with minimal, if any,
procedural safeguards. Thus the magnitude of the phenomenon remained
hidden from the public, which still tends to think that suspensions are
confined to a few extremely disruptive troublemakers.
A recent report by the Children's Defense Fund analyzed data from five
states collected by HEW's Office of Civil Rights in the fall of 1973.132
These data show that in those five states, 152,904 children were suspended
at least once during the 1972-73 school year-approximately one out of
every twenty school-age children.13 3 The Children's Defense Fund's own
survey reveals the following reasons for suspensions:134
(1) 24.5% of the suspensions were for offenses related to truancy and
tardiness;
(2) A substantial percentage of the suspensions, 13.6%, were behavior
problems, characterized as "acting out," "bad attitude," insubordina-
tion, disobeyed teacher, inattentive in class, cursing, in school bus
at the wrong time, cutting in lunch line, went to lunch without
permission;
(3) 8.5% of the suspensions were for arguments or some kind of verbal
confrontation: insulting teacher, talking back, disrespect for teacher
or principal, swore at teacher, arguments between students, calling
other students bad names;
(4) 5.6% of the suspensions were for smoking, and 4.1% were for
punishment-related offenses (e.g., student refused to stay for de-
tention or refused to clean the grounds as ordered);
(5) Less than 3% were suspended for use of drugs and alcohol.
Thus, a majority of the suspensions, nearly sixty-five percent of those in
the states surveyed, were for offenses that were not dangerous. The re-
mainder of the suspensions, 36.6%, were for fighting with teacher, fighting
on bus, fighting with another student.
1 Id.
' The five states are Arkansas, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio and South Carolina. Id. at 124.
2"3 Id.
" Id. at 120, Table I.
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Racial and Class Discrimination
There is evidence that racial discrimination is involved in the use of
suspensions. 135 In the five states surveyed, over 50% of suspended students
were minority, though less than 40% of the total enrollment was minority.
In one hundred of the districts surveyed, at least ten percent of the black
student population was suspended. At the secondary school level, black
students are suspended more than three times as often as white males. In
six areas surveyed, over twenty percent of black secondary school-age males
were suspended and in three areas, over thirty percent. 136 Black females
were suspended over four times as often as white females. The Children's
Defense Fund report also notes that in
school districts where there are few blacks, Puerto Ricans, or Chicanos,
it is the lower-income [white] children who often bear the disproportionate
brunt of school officials' disciplinary action. It is almost as if some group of
children must be scapegoated by some officials.'3 7
Procedural Safeguards
Since suspension has usually been the prerogative of the principal, to be
exercised at his discretion, few districts have had substantive or procedural
guidelines governing suspensions. 13 It was not until 1961 that the Fifth
Circuit, in a case involving a student from a state college, held that due
process requires notice and some opportunity for a hearing before a student
is expelled for misconduct. 39 Subsequent cases extended the holding to
include suspension from a state college, 40 expulsion from a high school,' 4'
and then suspension from a public high school. 42 By the beginning of this
decade, courts began to require prior hearings for suspensions of varying
length. The question of what the minimal period of suspension would be
to trigger due process requirements seemed to vary from court to court, one
going so far as to note that
a suspension of even one hour could be quite critical to an individual
student if that hour encompassed a final examination that provided for no
"make-up." 143
'-"See Hawkins v. Coleman, supra note 30 and accompanying text.
2 CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND at 130.
2? Id. at 134.
1 Id. at 139-40.
mfDixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930
(1961).
210 See, e.g., Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F.Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967).141 See, e.g., Vought v. Van Buren Public Schools, 306 F.Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
U22 See, e.g., Williams v. Dade Cty Sch. Bd., 441 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1971).
'13Shanley v. Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 967 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1972), quoted in
CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND at 141.
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All of the foregoing is by way of background for the Supreme Court's
intervention into the area of student suspensions in Goss v. Lopez,144 on
January 22, 1975. That case arose in Columbus, Ohio as a result of a period
in which there had been widespread student unrest. The Ohio statutes
provided for a hearing or an appeal to the School Board in the case of an
expulsion, but there was no procedure for suspensions. Thus a high school
student could be temporarily suspended without a hearing.
The three-judge district court held that it was a denial of due process
of law not to provide at least some "minimum requirements of notice and
hearing prior to suspension, except in emergency situations," 1'5 and the
Supreme Court affirmed, with Justice White writing the opinion for the
Court, joined by Justices Brennan, Douglas, Stewart, and Marshall. Justice
Powell wrote the dissent, joined by the Chief Justice, and Justices Black-
mun and Rehnquist.
The Court pointed out that even though education is not a constitutional
right (as held in Rodriguez), the State of Ohio, having chosen to extend the
benefit of education to all children between the ages of six and twenty-one,
cannot withdraw the benefit on the grounds of misconduct without provid-
ing for some constitutionally fair procedure through which one can deter-
mine whether or not the misconduct actually occurred. The Court treats
this as a property right which cannot be infringed without due process of
law.146 The Court also points out that if a student is suspended and the
charges are recorded, the student's standing is damaged with his present
and future teachers, and it may interfere with his later opportunity for
higher education and employment. 147
The Court notes that a short suspension-one of less than ten days-is
certainly a milder "deprivation" than expulsion, but "in view of the im-
portance of education" it is not a "trivial period" but a "serious event" in
the life of the suspended child:
Neither the property interest in educational benefits temporarily denied
nor the liberty interest in reputation, which is also implicated, is so
insubstantial that suspensions may constitutionally be imposed by any
procedure the school chooses, no matter how arbitrary.148
But, as the Court points out, "once it is determined that due process
applies, the question remains what process is due." 1-9
"At the very minimum.... students facing suspension.., must be given
- 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
115 Id. at 572.
"'1 Id. at 574.
n7 Id. at 575.
114 Id. at 576.
19Id. at 577, citing Morrissey v. Brewer. 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
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some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing," 150 although the
timing and the content of the notice and the nature of the hearing will
depend upon "appropriate accommodation" of the competing interests
involved. 15 1 What are these interests? On the one hand, the student wants
to avoid unfair or mistaken exclusion from the educational process. 152 On
the other, the school system must be able to maintain discipline and order
so that the educational process can continue. In addition, the Court recog-
nizes that suspension is "a valuable educational device." 153 Thus, impos-
ing elaborate hearing requirements in every suspension case would be a
problem.
What this boils down to is that the student who faces a temporary (10
days or less) suspension must be "given oral or written notice of the charges
against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the
authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story." 154
Under certain circumstances, this opportunity need not be granted prior
to the suspension but as soon as practicable thereafter. 5 5 Justice White
indicates that longer suspensions might require much more formal pro-
cedures which, at some point, could include the right to counsel, to con-
front and cross-examine witnesses, and to call his own witnesses to verify
his version of the incident. Indeed, the Court suggests that there even may
be some unusual situations involving only a short suspension which will re-
quire something more than the rudimentary procedures outlined in
Goss.
5 6
The dissenting opinion makes about five major points:
(1) Justice Powell does not disagree with the Court that the right or
entitlement to education created by the statutes and constitutional pro-
visions of Ohio is an entitlement that must be protected in a proper case
1 Id. at 579.
51Id.
'-The Court illustrates the problem by referring to a student (Lopez) who was suspended,
along with many others, in connection with a disturbance in the lunch room. Lopez insisted
that he was not involved in the disturbance but was a mere bystander. However, he was not
only not given an opportunity to explain his presence in the lunch room, he was never told
the basis for the belief that he was involved. The Court also refers to a case in which a
student was suspended for conduct which did not even occur on school grounds. A disturbance
occurred at another school, and there were mass arrests, of which she was one. As the Court
points out, this "hardly guarantee[s] careful individualized fact finding by the police or by the
school principal." The student not only claimed not to have been involved in any misconduct,
but also alleged that she was suspended for ten days without being told what she was accused
of doing or given an opportunity to explain her presence among those arrested. Id. at 580 n. 9.
21- Id. at 580.
14 Id. at 581.
1I d. at 582.
O ld. at 584.
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by the due process clause. The disagreement is over whether this particular
case is "a proper case." A suspension of not more than ten days is not a
serious detriment or loss, and does not begin to assume "constitutional
dimensions." 157
(2) Secondly, Justice Powell expresses his concern that the Court is
going back on its prior decisions which have held that "school authorities
must have broad discretionary authority in the daily operation of public
schools." 158
(3) Justice Powell also points out that the educational rights of children
and teenagers are not equivalent to the rights of adults or even to those
accorded college students. Even in the case of the first amendment, as
Tinker1 9 itself indicates, the rights of children are not coextensive with
those of adults.
(4) It is clear that the dissent views the case from a very different per-
spective, emphasizing the right of other pupils to a properly functioning
public school system, rather than the individual rights of the suspended
student which the majority emphasizes.
(5) Finally, the dissenting opinion raises the "parade of horribles" that
may follow from Goss v. Lopez. Courts will intervene in such decisions as
how a teacher is to
grade the student's work, whether a student passes or fails a course, whether
he is to be promoted, whether he is required to take certain subjects,
whether he may be excluded from interscholastic athletics or other ex-
tracurricular activities, whether he may be removed from one school and
sent to another, whether he may be bused long distances when available
schools are nearby, and whether he should be placed in a 'general,' 'voca-
tional' or 'college-preparatory' track.160
As the ultimate horrible, the dissent says that federal courts will sub-
stitute their judgment "for that of 50 state legislatures, 14,000 school
boards, and 2,000,000 teachers who heretofore have been responsible for
the administration of the American public school system." 161
CONCLUSION
This article has focused on the courts and equal educational opportunity
litigation. Since there are differing notions of what equal educational
opportunity is, litigation strategies are many and varied. In the course of
17Id. at 587.
'ld. at 589.
mTinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
Ieo 419 U.S. 597.
11 Id. at 599.
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reviewing the case law in this area, several theories of equal educational
opportunity have been examined-equal treatment of the races and of
the sexes; equal access to school resources; equal educational opportunity
for the handicapped, including those who are totally excluded from' public
schooling and those who are placed in inappropriate and sometimes damag-
ing programs; and finally, equal educational opportunity for those who are
"functionally excluded" either because of a language barrier or through
disciplinary procedures such as multiple suspensions.
However one defines Equal Educational Opportunity, the ultimate ob-
jective should be to ensure that every child in a state-regardless of his
race, sex, socioeconomic background, physical or mental handicap, or
place of residence-has "that educational opportunity which is needed
in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen and
as a competitor in the labor market." 162 And one might add to this: to
equip a child to have a meaningful and satisfying life with the maximum
feasible options that only an adequate education can give.
2" Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473,515, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (1973).
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